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AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE OCTOBER 2007 SUPREME COURT TERM
Richard Klein*

INTRODUCTION

It was, once again, a notable and highly significant term of the
Supreme Court when it came to decisions relating to the death penalty. The Court dealt with numerous basic concerns, such as the use
of peremptory challenges to eliminate a juror due to the extra time
that a capital prosecution may require,1 whether the lethal injection
used by most states in the country to implement the death penalty
constituted cruel and unusual punishment,2 whether the death penalty
for the rape of a child constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, 3 and
whether a state's criminal procedure rules must give way in light of a
ruling by the International Court of Justice and a Presidential instruction to the state to adhere to the World Court's decision.4
The Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence has been
under a great deal of scrutiny in recent years as the Court has restricted the categories of people subject to capital prosecutions. In
* Bruce K. Gould Distinguished Professor of Law, Touro Law Center; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1972. This Article is based on a presentation given at the Twentieth Annual Leon D.
Lazer Supreme Court Review Program presented at Touro Law Center, Central Islip, New
York.
1 Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008).
2 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
3 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
4 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
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the 2005 case of Roper v. Simmons, 5 the Court held that it was unconstitutional and a violation of the Eighth Amendment to impose the
death penalty on those who were less than eighteen-years old when
the crime was committed.6 In doing so, the Court reversed its earlier
holding in Stanford v. Kentucky, 7 which had upheld the death sentence for juveniles. 8 In 2002, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia9 exempted those who were suffering from mental retardation from execution.1°

The Atkins Court thereby reversed its decision of only

thirteen years earlier, in Penry v. Lynaugh,1 which had authorized
12

such executions.
I.

BAZE V.REES

As a result of the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Baze
v. Rees 13 in September of 2007, there was a moratorium on the imposition of the death penalty in this country. The Supreme Court had
decided to determine whether the means used by thirty out of thirtysix states to put someone to death was constitutional. 14 Therefore, for

' 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
6 Id. at 573.

7 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The prior year, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court
overturned the death sentence for a fifteen-year-old, but did not decide the validity of the
death penalty for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
8 Id. at 380.

9 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
10 Id. at 321.

" 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
12 Id. at 340. In doing so, the Court emphasized the importance of understanding that the
Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12.
13 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).

14 Id. at 1525-26. Twenty-seven of the thirty-six states which have the death penalty, provide for the utilization of lethal injection as the exclusive method for implementing the penalty. Id. at 1527 n. 1. At the time of the Court's decision in Baze, Nebraska was the only
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a period dating from September of 2007 until the Supreme Court's
decision in Baze came down in April 2008, there was no one subjected to capital punishment in this country. There was no majority
opinion in Baze, even though the split in the Court was seven-to-two;
Chief Justice Roberts authored the plurality opinion and was joined
by Justices Kennedy and Alito. 15

Justice Alito issued a concur-

rence, 16 as did Justice Stevens; 17 Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia
in a concurrence. 18 Justice Breyer filed a separate concurring opinion, 19 and Justice Souter joined in Justice Ginsburg's dissent.2 °
The Eighth Amendment clearly prohibits the imposition by
the state of "cruel and unusual punishment.,

21

The exact meaning of

that phrase has, however, most certainly changed over the years. The
earliest Supreme Court holdings, as illustrated by Wilkerson v.
Utah,2 2 considered the language to apply exclusively to "punishments
of torture.

23

The protection, therefore, was believed to apply to

those who were imprisoned, and applied exclusively to the treatment

state whose laws had provided for electrocution to be the sole method of execution. Id. Lethal injection is the means that the federal government uses. Id. The first state to utilize the
drug cocktail as the means for implementation of the death penalty was Oklahoma in 1978.
Seema Shah, How Lethal Injection Reform Constitutes Impermissible Research on Prisoners, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1101, 1104 (2008). The two drug cocktails became the nowwidely-used three drug mix when Oklahoma in 1981 added potassium chloride. Id. at 110405.
IS Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1525.
16 Id. at 1538.
Id. at 1542.
18 Id. at 1552.
17

Justice Thomas filed a separate concurring opinion which was joined by

Justice Scalia. Id. at 1556.
19 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1563.
20 Id. at 1567.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
22 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
23 Id. at 136. The Court, therefore, concluded that death by the firing squad did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 135.
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of the incarcerated. 24 The Court had not held that the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment were applicable to the states until
25
1962 in Robinson v. California.
The lethal injection that was under consideration by the Supreme Court in Baze is a three-drug cocktail.26 The first drug which
is given to the inmate, sodium thiopental, is supposed to anesthetize
the person-put him to sleep so he cannot feel any pain when the
second and third drugs are put into his system.27 The problem was
that it had been shown a number of times that the amount of anesthesia that was used in this first drug was simply not enough to put the
person to sleep-the person would still feel the pain that comes about
when drug number two and drug number three were shot into his system.28 There was a research study that was published in the eminent
medical journal, Lancet, in 2005, that analyzed forty-nine autopsies
and showed that of all of the people who were put to death via this
lethal injection cocktail, forty-three percent of them had not had a
sufficient amount of anesthesia in their bodies to make certain that
they were not feeling pain when the subsequent drugs were put into
their bodies. 29 It is clear, and it is a given, that if someone is con24 Justice Thomas' concurrence in Baze indicates that he still shares this perspective: "In

my view, a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain." Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas elaborated that, "the Eighth Amendment was intended to disable Congress from imposing torturous punishments." Id. at 1558.
370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962).
26 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1527.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1571-72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
29 Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution,
25

365 THE LANCET 1412, Apr. 16-Apr. 22, 2005. Autopsy and toxicology results from Geor-

gia, Arizona, North and South Carolina were all examined. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1564 (Thomas, J., concurring). A follow up research study to the Lancet analysis focused on Califor-
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scious when the second and third drugs are injected into them, the
pain that is suffered constitutes cruel and unusual pain, and is virtually unbearable.3 °
Lower courts had found that execution by the three drug cocktail did constitute cruel and unusual punishment.3 '

In Morales v.

Tilton,32 the Northern District of California court concluded that the
lethal injection actually administered "create[s] an undue and unnecessary risk that an inmate will suffer pain so extreme that it offends
the Eighth Amendment.,

33

The Supreme Court's consideration of le-

thal injection had been limited, prior to Baze, by two cases, Hill v.
McDonough34 and Nelson v. Campbell.35

Both of those cases

emerged from emergency applications by an inmate for a stay in the
execution of the death sentence, and examined only what procedures
could be utilized to raise Eighth Amendment challenges.36
The first dilemma that the Supreme Court focused on was that

nia and North Carolina. The authors concluded that there was "strong evidence that the lethal injection protocol provides a substantial risk of inadequate anesthesia both due to failures of process, as well as problems in the protocol design itself." Teresa A. Zimmers &
Leonidas G. Koniaris, Peer-Reviewed Studies Identifying Problems in the Design and Implementation of Lethal Injectionfor Execution, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919, 929 (2008).
30 Zimmers & Koniaris, supra note 29, at 921.
31 See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-CV-C-FJG, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8 (W.D. Mo.
2006), rev'd, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing the district court's holding that found
the protocol used violated the Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2047 (2008).
32 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Similarly, a federal district court judge in Tennessee concluded that the protocol presents a substantial risk that the inmate "will not be unconscious when the second and third drugs are administered." Elizabeth Semel, Baze v.
Rees: FearingToo Much Justice,NAT'L L.J. 22, May 12, 2008.
33Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 974.
14 547 U.S. 573 (2006).
15 541 U.S. 637 (2004).
" See Hill, 547 U.S. at 578, 584 (holding that a stay of execution is an equitable remedy
that should not be unduly influenced by federal courts.); see also Nelson, 541 U.S. at 641,
650 (holding that the "ability to bring a § 1983 claim, rather than a habeas application, does
not entirely free inmates from substantive or procedural limitations").
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a state will not have an anesthesiologist present when the person is
connected to the intravenous tubes delivering the anesthesia because
the American Society of Anesthesiologists has declared it is against
the profession's ethical standards to participate in state executions.37
No medical doctor at all will be there, because the American Medical
Association ("AMA") has declared that the obligation of doctors is to
help their patients live a healthy life, and ought, therefore, not to be
39
part of a state execution. 38 The same applies to the codes of nurses
as well as to EMT workers. 40

As a result, it is exclusively non-

medical personnel who are charged with administering the machines
responsible for causing the death. At the time that the first anesthesia
is injected into the body of the inmate, the warden and the deputy
warden are the only people in that room. 41 They certify, based
strictly on visual observation, that there is enough anesthesia given so

7 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1536 (citing Brief for American Society of Anesthesiologists as
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1520 (No. 07-5439), availableat
http://www.asahq.org/Washington/FinalASAAmicusBrief.pdf)).
38 Id. at 1539 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics, AMA Policy E.206 Capital Punishment (2000), available at http://www.amaassn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/369/e2O6capitalpunish.pdf)). The policy noted that "a physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when there is hope of doing
so, should not be a participant in a legally authorized execution." Id.
39 Id. (citing American Nurses Association, Position Statement, Nurses' Participation in
Capital Punishment (1994)). The Nurses Association's Position Statement holds that participation in an execution would constitute a "breach of the ethical traditions of nursing, and
the Code for Nurses." Id. Therefore, a nurse is prohibited from participating "in assessment,
supervision or monitoring of the procedure or the prisoner; procuring, prescribing or preparing medications or solutions; inserting the intravenous catheter; injecting the lethal solution;
and attending or witnessing the execution as a nurse." Id.
40 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1539-40 (citing The National Association of Emergency Medical
Technicians, Position Statement on EMT and Paramedic Participation in Capital Punishment,
June
2006,
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20060821052344/www.naemt.org/aboutNAEMT/capitalpunishm
ent.htm)).
41 Id. at 1569 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the second and third drugs can be put into the body.42 There is no
blood pressure taken.43 There is no administration of the EKG, which
is routinely given to an individual after anesthesia to ensure that a patient undergoing surgery will not sense the subsequent surgery.44 The
EKG is only utilized at an execution at the conclusion of the process
to confirm that the prisoner has died.45
Drug number two, which paralyzes the body and stops the
breathing, also presents a problem. 46 Pancuronium bromide is such
an untested drug, and so potentially painful, that veterinarians in
twenty-three states are prohibited from using this drug. 47 The American Veterinary Medical Association ("AVMA") bans the use of this
drug. 48 In fact, both the AVMA, as well as the Humane Society,
submitted amicus briefs to the Supreme Court maintaining that the
use of drug number two constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and
is inhumane.49 Chief Justice Roberts, writing the opinion for the
Court, and joined by Justices Alito and Kennedy, responded to this
claim by stating that, "veterinary practice for animals is not an appro42

Id. There is no additional confirmation that the individual is not conscious; Kentucky

has failed to use any additional, basic test to confirm this fact. Id.
41 Id. at 1570.
44 Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1570 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

Justice Ginsburg therefore concluded that there is no assurance that the anesthesia has been properly administered. Id. at
1571.
45 Id. at 1528. Death does not always come so quickly. The longest execution on record
occurred in Texas in 1998. The procedure lasted for two hours because prison officials had
difficulty inserting the intravenous needles into the veins of the inmate. Shah, supra note 14,
at 1106-07.
46 Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1527.
47 Id. at 1535.
48 AM. VETERINARY MEDICAL ASS'N, AVMA GUIDELINES ON EUTHANASIA (2007), available at http://www.avma.org/issues/animal-welfare/euthanasia.pdf.
49 Brief for Dr. Kevin Concannon et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Baze, 128
S. Ct. at 1520 (No. 07-5439), 2007 WL 3440946; Brief for Human Rights Watch as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1520 (No. 07-5439), 2007 WL 3407043.
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Therefore, even

though veterinarians believe that this drug is too harmful to be administered to animals, it is used to put humans to death. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, concluded that drug number two is not warranted at all.51 It paralyzes someone, rendering that person incapable
of expressing any pain he might be feeling.52 His vocal cords are
paralyzed as well. Chief Justice Roberts, however, concluded that
there was a state interest in utilizing drug number two; the state interest is in preserving the dignity of the procedure and avoiding the inmate suffering convulsions or seizures which could be perceived as
signs of consciousness or distress.5 3 In other words, Justice Roberts
and the majority determined that it is better to have someone paralyzed, and not able to move so that the people watching the death
procedure will not think the person is conscious and in pain.5 4 Justice
Ginsburg, in her dissent, concluded that drug number two should not
be used, because it could prevent someone from being able to make it
known that he is in excruciating pain.55 And drug number three, potassium chloride, will most certainly cause such pain as it induces
cardiac arrest.

5o Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1536.

"' Id. at 1543-44 (Stevens, J., concurring).
52 Id. at 1544.

53 Id. at 1535 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens responded to this claimed state interest
as a "woefully inadequate justification." Id. at 1544 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens explained that "[w]hatever minimal interest there may be in ensuring that a condemned
inmate dies a dignified death, and that witnesses to the execution are not made uncomfortable by an incorrect belief (which could easily be corrected) that the inmate is in pain, is
vastly outweighed by the risk that the inmate is actually experiencing excruciating pain that
no one can detect." Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1544 (Stevens, J., concurring).
14 See id.
55 Id. at 1569 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court has consistently found the imposition of
the death penalty is not, per se, unconstitutiona156-a

declaration re-

peated in Baze.57 The Court has cited the Bill of Rights as a clear indication that the Founding Fathers had contemplated a death penalty.

8

The guarantee that no one should be "deprived of life" without

due process of the law, assumed that one could be so deprived as long
as due processes guarantees were in place.59

Similarly, the Fifth

Amendment requires an indictment for "a capital or otherwise infamous crime.

60

Indeed, at one point, every state in the country had a

death penalty provision.61
Michigan was the first state to abolish the death penalty in
1846, and it has never reinstated capital punishment. 62 The Furman
v. Georgia63 holding by the Court, finding the death penalty statutes
of two states to be unconstitutional, had the effect of stopping any
execution by any state in the country, even though there were at the
time approximately six hundred individuals on death row throughout
the country. 64
Furman remains the longest decision in the history of the
Court. 65 But the five-to-four decision was short lived.

56 See, e.g., Campbell v. Wood,

Part of the

511 U.S. 1119, 2125 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976); Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 134-35.
57 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1526-27 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
58 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177.
59 Id.
60 U.S. CONST.
61
62

amend. V.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 338 (1972). However, Michigan retained the death

penalty for the crime of treason. Id.
63 408 U.S. at 238.
64 Id. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting).
65

Carol S. Steiker, Furman v. Georgia, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 110 (John H. Blume
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reason that it was necessary for the Court to revisit its decision so
soon, was the lack of clarity that resulted from the Court's holding.
As the Congressional Digest wrote the year following the Furman
decision, "confusion resulting from the Supreme Court's ruling has
resulted in a variety of responses among the states to different-and
frequently conflicting-interpretations of how the decision affects
66
their Capital Punishment laws.",

If every means of putting someone to death is cruel and unusual, how will the country be able to implement what is considered
to be a constitutional process?

Whenever the Supreme Court has

been confronted with the claim that the mode in which the state is
putting someone to death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, it
has found the practice at issue was not cruel and unusual.67 In 1879,
in Wilkerson v. Utah,68 the Court found that a firing squad did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.69

In 1890, in In re

Kemmler, 7° the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the
electric chair being used in New York State constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 71 The Court found the electric chair did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.72 In 1983, in Gray v. Lucas,73
the Court found the gas chamber did not constitute cruel and unusual

Jordan M. Steiker, eds.) (2009). The decision consists of the 50,000 words.
66 Steiker, supra note 64, at 115 (quoting Congressional Digest, January 1973).
67 See Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890);
Wilkerson, 99 U.S. 130.
68 Id.

Id. at 134-35.
70 136 U.S. at 436.
71 Id. at441.
72 Id. at 443-44.
7' 463 U.S. at 1237.
69
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The Court had concluded that some form of pain,

some risk of pain, is bound to be part of this whole process.75 Feeling
pain was inevitable, and suffering some sort of pain did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.76
After the Baze decision upholding the constitutionality of the
three drug lethal injection,77 the moratorium was over; on that same
day, Governor Schwarzenegger in California stated that, "[t]oday's
U.S. Supreme Court decision supports California's lethal injection
protocol and allows our case[s] to move forward.

78

And move for-

ward, they did, although not without problems. 79 The Court was
really aware that its decision would impact many more states than
just Kentucky, therefore, the Court's guidance was clear: "A state
with a lethal protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold
today would not create a risk that meets this standard" of showing
80
impermissible and unconstitutional infliction of severe pain.
One very important aspect of Baze, was that for the first time,
Justice Stevens opined that he had concluded that the death penalty
was unconstitutional.81

Justice Stevens determined that there is no

purpose of punishment served by the death penalty that cannot also
74

Id. at 1239-40 (Burger, J., concurring).

75 Id.
76 Id.

Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1538.
78 See Semel, supra note 32.
79 Despite Governor Schwarzenegger's proclamation, California's executions remained on
hold "because a state court ruled that the corrections department had failed to promulgate its
protocol according to the requirements of the state's administrative procedures act ... [and]
a federal judge who concluded that the state's procedures violated the Eighth Amendment
ha[d] yet to review the revised protocol to determine whether it satisfie[d] the Baze standard." Id.
80 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1537.
81 Id. at 1546 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77
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be served by life without parole.8 2 He also concluded that race continues to play a factor in determining who receives the death penalty,83 there is a high risk of executing the innocent,84 and, the use of
death qualified jurors presents such a problem in death penalty cases
as to lead to the conclusion that the death penalty is unconstitutional.85 The standard of "death qualified jurors" means that one can
only sit on a death penalty case, even to consider the guilt or innocence of the defendant, if that individual is willing to impose the
death penalty if the case were to be found to appropriately warrant
such penalty.86 Justice Stevens, therefore, had concluded that the jury
that will be able to sit in any capital case will be one that is biased in
favor of the prosecution.87
Justice Stevens' opposition on the death penalty was clearly
and unambiguously stated:
In sum, just as Justice White ultimately based his conclusion in Furman on his extensive exposure to countless cases for which death is the authorized penalty, I
have relied on my own experience in reaching the
conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty
represents "the pointless and needless extinction of
life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such
negligible returns to the State [is] patently excessive
and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the
82 Id. at 1547.
83 Id. at 1551.
84

id.

85 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1550.
86 For a definition of a death qualified jury, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (8th ed.
2004) ("A jury that is fit to decide a case involving the death penalty because the jurors have
no absolute ideological bias against capital punishment").
87 Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1550 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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His opposition to the death penalty is all the more notable since he
had provided one of the decisive votes in Gregg v. Georgia in 1976,
which permitted states after a four-year hiatus to once again implement a sentence of death.89
In light of this opposition to the existence of a death penalty,
one would expect that Justice Stevens would have found the Kentucky mode for imposing death to be unconstitutional. Such was not
the case. Acknowledging that his determination as to the unconstitutionality of the death penalty "makes my decision in this case particularly difficult," 90 Justice Stevens concluded that he was bound to adhere to the principle of stare decisis. 9 1 In accord with the Court's
prior rulings regarding Capital Punishment, Justice Stevens determined that there was insufficient proof that Kentucky's protocol was
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 92
II.

KENNEDY v. LOUISIANA

In Kennedy v. Louisiana,93 the Court was presented with an
issue which required a comparison of the crime of child rape with
that of murder. Is the child rapist as deserving of the death penalty as
someone who takes the life of another? Does society's rage and raw
88

concurring)).
Id. at 1551 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J.,

89 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158, 206-07 (1976).
concurring).
90 Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1552 (Stevens J.,

91 Id. To this extent, Justice Stevens was in agreement with Justice Thomas who wrote
that "the lawfulness of the death penalty is not before us." Id. at 1567 (Thomas, J., concurring).
92 Id. at 1552 (Stevens J., concurring).
" 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008).
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emotion against someone who rapes a child mean that the death sentence would not be excessive, and that the death sentence would not
be disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment? The issue in Kennedy was the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute enacted in
199594 which, for the first time in this country since 1972, declared
that the rape of someone who is less than twelve years old would
constitute a crime for which the perpetrator could receive the death
penalty. 95 The defendant was convicted of raping an eight-year-old,
and was sentenced to death in Louisiana.96 In 1977, in Coker v.
Georgia,97 the Supreme Court had found the death penalty for the
crime of rape was unconstitutional because it was disproportionate
and excessive.98 The difference between Coker and Kennedy was
that the victim in Coker was an adult, and, as such, that case did not
specifically deal with the rape of a child. 99
The Coker case was decided just one year after the Gregg v.
Georgia decision had reactivated the death penalty. 100 The roots of
Coker's holding that the death sentence was disproportionate to the
crime of rape can be traced back to the 1910 case of Weems v. United
States. 0 1 Although not a death penalty case, Weems established the
concept that an excessive sentence would constitute cruel and un-

94 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (West 1997).
95 Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2651. After Justice Kennedy's conviction and sentencing, the
statute was amended and the age was increased from twelve to thirteen years. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14: 42 (West 2007).
96

Id. at 2648.

17 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
9' Id. at 592.

99 Compare id. at 587, with Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646.
100 See generally Gregg,428 U.S. at 153; Coker, 433 U.S. at 584.
101 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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usual punishment. 102
The dissents of Justices Goldberg, Douglas, and Brennan in
1963 to a denial by the Court of an application for certiorari laid the
groundwork for Coker. The Rudolph v. Alabama'0 3 case involved a
capital conviction, and the dissenting opinion linked the matter to the
increasingly important evolving standard of decency test. The Goldberg opinion noted the trend both domestically and internationally
against a sentence of death for the crime of rape and stated that "the
imposition of the death penalty by those States which retain it for
rape violated 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of our maturing society.' ,9104
Yet by the time of Furman v. Georgia in 1972, sixteen states
had statutes which did allow the death sentence for a rape conviction.1 °5 But in the years between 1972 and the 1977 Coker case, the
numbers had dwindled and only three states had statutes designating
rape a capital offense. 10 6 But the Court prior to Coker had invalidated
the North Carolina statute in Woodson v. North Carolina'0 7 and the
Louisiana statute in Roberts v. Louisiana.10 8 The statutes of those
two states had made the death penalty a mandatory sentence for rape
and the Court held that such a provision was in violation of its hold1
ing in Gregg v. Georgia.09

'02 Id. at 383.
103

375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).

1o4Id. at 889-90 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))
105
106

Coker, 433 U.S. at 593.
Id. at 593-94.

107 428 U.S. 280 (1976).

'0'428 U.S. 325 (1976).
109 Id. at 333-34. Gregg had clearly held that the death penalty was appropriate only when
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In recent years, when deciding whether the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the Court has increasingly utilized the evolving standards of decency test. 110 In 2002, in Atkins v.
Virginia,'" the Court reversed a decision given thirteen years earlier
regarding the execution of the mentally retarded.'

12

The Court found

there was an evolving standard of decency in this country which re13
quired a prohibition on the execution of the mentally retarded.
Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons,

14

decided in 2005, the Court re-

versed an earlier holding given seventeen years prior to Simmons regarding the execution of juveniles.' 15 As in Atkins,1 16 the Court found
that standards of decency in this country had evolved and the Court
was required to respond.

17

The Court concluded that we should no

longer execute people who were less than eighteen years old at the
18
time they committed the crime.
The Kennedy Court, in determining the standard of decency
appropriate for deeming child rape to be a capital crime, proceeded
by counting the number of states with statute similar to that of Louisiana. The Court determined that there were only six states that had
enacted laws calling for the death penalty for individuals convicted of

there is a determination that aggravating factors apply that outweigh the mitigating factors in
a specific case. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
"Io Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649.
...536 U.S. 304 (2002).
112 Id. at 321.
113 Id. at 318, 320.
114 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
115 Id. at 573-74 (reversing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)).
116 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, 320.
117 Roper, 543 U.S. at 563-64.
118 Id.at 573.
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child rape.' 19 The Court concluded that there was no demonstrated
emerging standard of decency favoring the imposition of the death
penalty upon someone who has been convicted of the rape of a
child. 120 The Court, therefore, held that it was unconstitutional to
permit the death sentence to be imposed on someone convicted of
21

1
child rape.

To be sure, such a finding by the Court was seen as callous
and improper by many, not the least of whom were the two leading
candidates for President of the United States. Barrack Obama's official statement clearly indicated his position:
I disagree with the decision. I have said repeatedly
that the death penalty should be applied in very narrow circumstances for the most egregious of crimes.
The rape of a small child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous
crime and if a state makes a decision that under narrow, limited, well-defined circumstances that the death
that that [sic]
penalty is at least potentially applicable,
22
Constitution.
the
violate[]
not
does
The Republican candidate's comments were equally strong.

John

McCain's statement concluded, "that there is a judge anywhere in
America who does not believe that the rape of a child represents the
most heinous of crimes, which is deserving of the most serious of
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2656. Louisiana enacted such a statute in 1995. See LA. REV.
§ 14:42 (West 2008). Thereafter, five other states enacted similar child rape
statutes: Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1 (West 2008); Montana, see MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-503 (West 2007); Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 10, § 7115 (West
2009); South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (2008); and Texas, see TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.42 (Vernon 2007).
120 Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2656.
121 Id. at 2665.
122 MSNBC, McCain, Obama Disagree With Child Rape Ruling, June 26, 2008,
"9

STAT. ANN.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25379987/.
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punishments, is profoundly disturbing."'' 23
The broad question presented is, perhaps, not one that is easily answered. Should not our penal system reflect the moral outrage
124
that many feel toward any individual who has raped a child?
Should our laws, however, be mere expressions of raw vengeance
that may conflict with our justice system's recognized goal of dispassionate justice?1 25 Society's outrage at a child rapist may well be
greater than that which would be directed to the perpetrator of a murder. The child victim has to live the remainder of his or her life
traumatized by what the defendant has done. The family of the child
victim can certainly be expected to suffer for years as well.
The case was another split decision. Justice Kennedy's opinion of the Court was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer;126 Justice Alito's dissent was joined by Justices Scalia,
Roberts, and Thomas.127 The Court noted the evidence illustrating
the inherent weakness of child testimony.

28

In this very case, the

eight-year-old girl who was raped had first insisted her stepfather,
Kennedy the defendant, had not been the person who raped her-it

123National Review Online, Bench Memos, McCain 's Reaction to Kennedy, Wednesday,
June

25,

2008,

http://bench.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MDAyMmY3YmUwY2IzZjhkNzFmOTcxOTZIN
DQ4NzgyZGY=.
124 See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Child Rape, Moral Outrage, and
the Death Penalty, 103
Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 17 (2008).

125 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Stephanos Bibas, Emerging CapitalEmotions, 102 Nw.

U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 355 (2008).
126 Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Punishmentfor ChildRape, 122 HARV. L. REV. 296,
298 n.23 (2008).
127 Id. at 300 n.38.
128 Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2663 ("The problem of unreliable, induced, and even imagined

child testimony means there is a 'special risk of wrongful execution' in some child rape
cases.") (quoting Atkins, 543 U.S. at 321)).
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was not until months afterwards that she said first that her stepfather
was the person who raped her. 129 Immediately after the attack upon
L.H., the police were called and she was taken to Children's Hospital.13 ° L.H. had initially maintained at the scene of the crime as well
as at the hospital, that two neighborhood boys has dragged her from
the garage at her home to the yard and proceeded to rape her.13 1 One
of L.H.'s doctors testified at the trial that L.H. had told all hospital
personnel the same account of the rape. 132 A psychologist conducted
an interview of L.H. that lasted for three hours and was spread over
several days. 133 The tape of the session contained the following
comment by L.H.: "I'm going to tell the same story. They just want
me to change it ....They want me to say my dad did it .... I don't

want to say it ....I tell them the same, same story.' ' 34 The first time
that L.H. had told someone that her father was the person who raped
135
her was over three months later when she so informed her mother.
The Court noted the special risk in wrongfully executing an accused
when a child is the only witness. 3 6 As is true with most rapes, of
course, child rape typically occurs when there is no witness other
than the victim of the attack.
Additionally, the Court concluded that if the crime of child
rape carries with it the imposition of the death penalty, there is an in-

129Id. at 2647.
130 Id. at 2646.
131 Id.
132 Id.

131Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2646.
134 Id.

131Id. at 2647.
136 See id. at 2663.
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creased probability that an individual who rapes a child may decide
he has nothing to lose by proceeding to kill the victim since the sentence would be no harsher for that crime and would possibly enable
the perpetrator to avoid detection. 137 The Court emphasized that the
death penalty is for the worst of the worst; murder is unique both in
showing the moral depravity of the defendant as well as in the harm
1 38
that is caused to the victim.

Justice Alito's dissent maintained that the majority's decision
had not given the appropriate interpretation to the fact that only six
states had enacted statutes providing for the death penalty for the
crime of child rape. 139 The majority of states thought Coker stood for
the proposition that the death penalty for any kind of rape would be
unconstitutional.

40

These six states, therefore, are not a real reflec-

tion of the totality of states, which may have desired to have the death
penalty for child rape.14' Many states, which may have believed that
the death penalty was appropriate for child rape, interpreted Coker as
prohibiting any such statute.

42

The majority, however, responded to

Justice Alito's claim by highlighting the eight times in Coker where
the Court repeated the phrase "an adult woman" or "an adult female"
when considering the appropriateness of imposing the death penalty
1

Id. at 2664.

138 Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660 ("The latter crimes may be devastating in their harm, as

here, but 'in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,' ... ,
they cannot be compared to murder in their 'severity and irrevocability.' ") (quoting Coker,
433 U.S. at 598)).
"9 Id. at 2672-73 (Alito, J., dissenting). The six states that capitalized child rape are as
follows: Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Id. at
2651 (majority opinion).
140 Id. at 2666 (Alito, J., dissenting).
141 Id.
142

Id. at 2668.
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for the rape of an adult.

43

Justice Alito expressed strong disagree-

ment with the claimed lack of a consensus as to child rape, and described the overall "growing alarm" relating to sexual abuse of children.144 The Court concluded that "there is no clear indication that
state legislatures have misinterpreted Coker to hold that the death
penalty for child rape is unconstitutional.

145

Louisiana was the only

state since 1964 to have sentenced a person to the death penalty for
146
the crime of rape of a child.
The Court in Kennedy drew a bright line rule-an absolute
clear dividing line-maintaining that the death penalty is only going
to be permitted for murder, i.e. intentionally causing the death of
someone.1 47 The Court's decision was consistent with its earlier
holding in Enmund v. Florida.148 In Enmund, the Court had overturned the death sentence for a defendant who had participated in a
robbery during which a murder was committed. 149 The Court's determination was based on the fact that Enmund himself had not done

14"Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2654 (majority opinion).
'44 Id. at 2670 (Alito, J., dissenting). Harsher treatment of sexual offenders, including
sexual registry laws, were also cited in support of an evolving consensus. Id. at 2670-71.
145Id. at 2656 (majority opinion).
146 Id. at 2657. Since the conviction and sentence of Kennedy, another individual, Richard
Davis, was also given the death sentence for the rape of a child in Louisiana.
141 Id. at 2659.
Our concern here is limited to crimes against individual persons. We do
not address, for example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity, which are offenses against the
State. As it relates to crimes against individuals, though, the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim's life was not
taken.
Id.
14'458 U.S. 782 (1982).
149Id. at 788.
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50

It did

not matter how much violence was caused by what the defendant did
as part of the commission of other crimes."' It did not matter how
many times the defendant might have raped someone; the death penalty is not an appropriate sentence unless there was the intention to
cause death and death resulted. 5 2 Justice Alito did not attempt to
cover his dismay at the much anticipated decision of the Court: "And
once all of the Court's irrelevant arguments are put aside, it is apparent that the Court has provided no coherent explanation for today's
' 15 3

decision."

There is a fascinating postscript to the Kennedy decision,
which occurred on October 1, 2008. The state of Louisiana petitioned for a rehearing on grounds that for the first time it realized that
it had failed to present to the Court a provision of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, a provision which imposes the death penalty as
punishment for the crime of child rape.154 The state maintained that
this was of significance and should impact the Court's consideration
of whether there is an evolving sense of decency that the death penalty is appropriate for child rape.1 55 The state of Louisiana claimed
150

Id.

In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the Court, however, permitted the impo-

sition of the death sentence for individuals who, although they themselves did not perform
the killing, had actually participated in the events leading up to the murder. Id. at 158.
151 SeeEnmund, 458 U.S. at 796, 798, 801.
152 Id.
15a Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2673 (Alito, J., dissenting).
114 Id.

at 2641, reh'g denied, Louisiana v. Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. 1, *1 (2008). See also
Linda Greenhouse, In Court Ruling on Executions, a FactualFlaw, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,

2008, at Al ("A military law blog pointed out ... that Congress, in fact, revised the sex
crimes section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 2006 to add child rape to the military death penalty."). 10 U.S.C.A. § 920 (West 2006).
155 Kennedy, reh'g denied, 129 S.Ct. at *1.

The State maintained that a federal military

statute authorizing the death penalty for rape, which had not previously been brought to the
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that it learned of this fact only after the Court's decision in Kennedy,
and, therefore, the state requested a rehearing. 156 The state's brief to
the Court took the opportunity to respond to the Court's discussion in
its holding of foreign countries' views regarding the use of the death
penalty to buttress the Court's conclusion that there is not an evolving sense that capital punishment is an appropriate sentence for child
rape.

57

Louisiana maintained that "the failure to consider domestic

military law would a fortiori call into question any reliance on the
5
laws and practices of foreign jurisdictions."'

8

Most interesting, perhaps, is the inclusion in the appendix to
the brief of the statements of Barack Obama and John McCain criticizing the Court's initial decision in the Kennedy case.

59

The state

highlighted the import of the military code: "This Court has never
held that military personnel could be subject to punishments that it
deems 'cruel and unusual' for the rest of the population ....

When

Congress enacts a law, be it military or civilian, that law is relevant
objective evidence of a national consensus." 160 The Court, however,
refused the petition for the rehearing. The Court declared that a law,
which relates strictly to the military, does not impact upon the fact
there is still a consensus in the civilian context against imposing the

attention of the Court by either party, "calls into question the majority opinion's conclusion
that there is a national consensus against capital punishment for rape of a child." Id. at *3
(Scalia J., concurring).
156 Id.

157 Final Brief on Kennedy v. Louisiana, SCOTUS, Supreme Court of the United States

Blog, Lyle Denniston, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/final-brief-onkennedy-v-louisiana/#more-7956.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.

HeinOnline -- 25 Touro L. Rev. 647 2009

648

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 25

death penalty for child rape.161
III.

SNYDER V. LOUISIANA

Snyder v. Louisiana162 dealt with the issue of who can be
qualified to sit as a juror in a death penalty case. 163 Once again, the
issue presented itself as a claim of racial discrimination in jury selection.

64

The defendant in Snyder was black. 165 Out of the eighty-five

potential jurors who were initially called as part of the jury pool,
there were nine potential black jurors. 166 The prosecutor successfully
challenged four of the blacks for cause. 167 The prosecutor used per68
emptory challenges to strike the remaining five prospective jurors.
Snyder's claim that the prosecution's use of its peremptory
challenges were race-based focused on the challenge to two black jurors in particular.' 69 The Court made it clear that the Constitution
protects against the use of even one challenge in a discriminatory
fashion and since the Court found that to be true in the first challenge
70
that the Court considered, the second claim was not reached.
To understand Snyder we have to look at Batson v. Ken-

161Kennedy, reh'gdenied, 129 S. Ct. at *2.
162 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008).
163 Id. at 1206.
164 Id.

Louisiana v. Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832, 839 (La. 1999).
166Lyle Denniston, Court Finds Flaws in La. Jury Choice, Supreme Court of the United
165

States
Blog,
SCOTUS,
March
19,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/?s=Court+Finds+Flaws+in+La.+Jury+Choice.
'67 Snyder, 750 So. 2d at 839.
16s Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1207.
169 Id. at 1208.
170 id.
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tucky, 171 a 1986 case in which the Supreme Court held the elimination
of even one juror based on that juror's race was unconstitutional, and
that a subsequent conviction could not stand. 1 2 What is required under the Batson scenario is that initially the defendant has to raise a
prima facie case that the intent of the prosecutor in peremptorily challenging the particular juror was racially based.1 13 Next, the prosecutor will attempt to claim that he did not challenge the person because
of race; that there is some other reason, a neutral reason, something
174
that has nothing to do with race which led to the challenge.

The use of the peremptory challenge, while not afforded protection in the Constitution, had been acknowledged by the Court to be
"one of the most important of the rights" in our justice system 175 and
"a necessary part of trial by jury."'1 76 The use of the challenge free of
judicial control has "been viewed as one means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury."' 17 7 It certainly is the case that
the peremptory challenge is often made as a result of limited information, an instinct or a hunch as a result of a quick first impression of a
prospective juror.
The harm by discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge
occurs not just to the defendant on trial. The Court in Batson recog-

171 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
172

Id. at 100.

"' See id. at 93-94 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976)).
174 Id. at 94 ("[T]he State must demonstrate that 'permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.' ") (quoting Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
175 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151
U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
176

Id.

177 Batson, 476 U.S. at 91.
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nized that the equal protection rights of the excluded group are affected. The black population must be accorded the same opportunities and the same rights as the white population in order to have its
proper role in the administration of justice.17 8
Batson v. Kentucky significantly changed the prior holding of
the Court in Swain v. Alabama

79

relating to the use of the peremp-

tory challenge and possible racial discrimination. The Court in Swain
held that a "State's purposeful or deliberate denial to negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice
violates the Equal Protection Clause."18

The Court's decision in

Swain has been interpreted as requiring that in order for the peremptory challenge to be deemed improperly discriminatory, it must be
shown that there have been "repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases." '18' Batson, however, established the principle that even
one striking of one potential juror in one defendant's case in an attempt to discriminate would be prohibited. 182 The Supreme Court
concluded that a change in Swain 's holding was required because the
"interpretation of Swain has placed on defendants a crippling burden
of proof, prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely im' 83
mune from constitutional scrutiny."'
The ruling in Batson itself has been revised. It is not any

118 Id. at 87.
"9 380 U.S. 202 (1965).

1

Id. at 203-04.

'8'

182

Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
Id. at 95.

183

Id. at 92-93.
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longer necessary, since Powers v. Ohio,'84 that the race of the challenged juror be the same race as the defendant. The Powers Court
emphasized the right of all individuals to partake in the justice system: "Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it
guards the rights of parties and ensures continued acceptance of the
laws by all of the people. It 'affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a process of government, an experience
fostering, one hopes, a respect for law.'

15185

The reach of Batson was extended in 1992 in Georgia v.
McCollum.,8 6 In this instance, the prosecution claimed that the defense should be barred from excluding jurors due to their race.'l

7

The

Court held that such claim was legitimate; although state action may
not be immediately apparent when defense counsel engages in discriminatory conduct, the Court held that the judge has to actually
bring about the exclusion of the juror and thereby the requirement for
action by the state is met. 8 8 In the final act, it was the court that had
excused a juror based on race, and this is properly viewed as an "outcome that will be attributed to the state."' 8 9
Batson was further expanded in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B.' 90 The focus in this civil case was whether or not the rationale of
the Batson holding should apply to gender-based peremptory chal-

184 499 U.S. 400 (1991).

185 Id. at 407 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968)).
86 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
187 Id. at 44-45.
188 Id. at 52-53.
89 Id. at 53.
'9' 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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The Court made it clear that it was not necessary to com-

pare the discrimination faced by racial minorities with that of
women. 192 "It is necessary only to acknowledge that 'our Nation has
had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,' a history
which warrants the heightened scrutiny we afford all gender-based
classifications today."' 193 The Court concluded that gender discrimination in the jury selection process harms not only the litigants, but
the individuals who are thereby excluded as jurors. 194
In Snyder, the prosecutor claimed that the challenge to the juror, Mr. Brooks, that was being reviewed by the Court was based, in
195
part, on the perceived nervousness of the juror during questioning.
After the prosecutor had submitted the claimed neutral reasons for the
challenge, it was up to the judge to determine whether it has been
shown that race was the real reason for the prosecutor's use of the
peremptory challenge. 196 The Snyder Court carefully examined the
explanation provided for challenging Brooks, who was involved in
student teaching and was in his last year of college. 197 The prosecutor expressed some concern about juror Brooks being able to sit as a
juror for as long as would be required. 198 Therefore, the judge had
the clerk of the court contact the dean of the college Brooks was at191 Id. at 130.
Id. at 136
193 Id. (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
194 Id. at 140-42.
192

19' Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1208.

196Id. at 1207 (" '[T]he trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.' ") (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 277 (2005) (Thomas,

J., dissenting)).
197 Id. at 1208.

198 Id. ("My main concern is ...that he might, to go home quickly, come back with guilty
of a lesser verdict so there wouldn't be a penalty phase.").
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tending to ask if it would be okay for Brooks to miss a couple of
days.
cur.

99

The dean said there would be no problem if that were to oc-

200

The prosecutor maintained that Brooks may have wished to
be out student teaching instead of sitting at trial, and therefore there
was a greater likelihood he would not find the defendant to be guilty
of murder because he knew that if he found the defendant guilty,
there would then need to be a penalty phase, which would take more
time. 20 1 As a result, this juror would either find the defendant not

guilty, or find him guilty of a lesser charge so the penalty phase
would not kick in.20 2 The trial itself was very short. The all-white
jury convicted the defendant in one day. The jurors found Snyder
guilty on Thursday, and on Friday during the penalty hearing, decided that the death penalty was the appropriate sentence.20 3 The
whole matter took just two days.
The Supreme Court, in examining the record as to the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges, noted that there were fifty
potential white jurors who had similarly expressed concern regarding
commitments that would possibly interfere with their jury duty.20 4
The prosecutor, however, did not use any peremptory challenges in

...Id. at 1210.
200

Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1210 ("Doctor Tillman at Southern University said that as long as

it's just this week, he doesn't see that it would cause a problem with Mr. Brooks completing
his observation time within this semester.").
211 Id. at 1210.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1210.
204 Id. at 1206, 1211.
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any of those cases.20 5 The Court commented that "[t]he implausibility of this explanation is reinforced by the prosecutor's acceptance of
white jurors who disclosed conflicting obligations that appear to have
been at least as serious as Mr. Brooks," the black juror who was challenged.20 6 Justice Alito's opinion was clear: "The prosecutor's proffer of this pretextual explanation naturally gives rise to an inference
of discriminatory intent.,

20 7

The second reason the prosecutor gave as an explanation for
his selecting the black juror to challenge was that the juror-and this
is the entire comment by the prosecutor-"looked very nervous to
[him] throughout the questioning. ' '20 8 The juror had not been challenged on account of race, rather it was his nervous response to being
asked questions on voir dire. 20 9 The defense counsel responded to the
trial judge, "hell, everybody out here looks nervous. I'm nervous.

2t0

The judge allowed the challenge without providing any basis for his
ruling.2"

As a result, the entire jury in the capital prosecution of

Snyder was white; the defendant was convicted and was sentenced to
death by an all white jury.

21 2

Justice Alito, along with six other justices, concluded that the
district attorney's reasons were a pretext; they were designed to ap-

205 Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1211.
206

Id. at 1212.

207

Id.

208 Id. at 1208.
209 Id.

210 Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1214.
211 Id. at 1208 (The Judge stated, "[a]ll right. I'm going to allow the challenge.").
212 Id. at 1207.
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pear as if there was not an intention to discriminate.21 3 What was of
great significance, and perhaps the most important part of this case,
was the justices' refusal to do what is so routinely done and was, in
the view of Justices Thomas and Scalia, what should have occurred in
this case: defer to the determination of the trial judge.214 It has long
been maintained that it is the trial judge who can best assess how
credible the prosecutor is when the prosecutor presents to the court a
neutral reason for the challenge. 1 5 The trial court is able to observe
the demeanor of both the potential juror as well as the prosecutor and
is best able to assess whether the prospective juror is someone who
should be eliminated or not.216 When the Supreme Court held that it
was not just going to defer in cases like this, but would require more
on the record and specifics showing this neutral reason is not just a
pretext, it could be expected to have a significant impact.

Trial

judges may well conclude that they better think a little harder before
they go ahead and simply accept any "neutral reason" as a justification for eliminating a potential juror, especially, perhaps when as in
the case, the juror is the same race as the defendant.21 7 More careful
monitoring by the trial judge of the connection between race and the
21 8
use of peremptory challenges may well result.

Id. at 1212, 1213 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1213, 1215.
215 Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1213, 1215 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[I]n the absence of excep213

214

tional circumstances, we [should] defer to state-court factual findings.") (quoting Hernandez
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 366 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
216 Id.
217

The Supreme Court 2007 Term-Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REv. 346, 346-47 (2008)

("In practice, the presumption will encourage trial judges to produce a clearer record for appellate review, where demeanor-based strikes will continue to enjoy an almost talismanic
immunity.").
218 Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1213, 1215 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas' dissent,
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MEDELLIN V. TEXAS

In Medellin v. Texas,219 the initial issue addressed was
whether the World Court, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"),
could inform a state court what process it must follow in a criminal
matter. 220 The second concern of the Supreme Court was whether the
President could instruct a state court as to the procedure it must follow in a criminal prosecution.221
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,222 which the
United States and Mexico had each signed, 223 requires a country that
arrests a foreigner to inform that individual of his right to contact his
embassy or consulate and request assistance in dealing with the
prosecution of the charges against him.224 The U.S. ratified the Convention in 1969,225 there are currently 171 countries that are signatories to the treaty.226 The primary function of the Convention, as
stated in its Preamble, is to "contribute to the development of friendly
relations among nations. ,,227 The U
U.S. had also ratified the Optional

joined by Justice Scalia, criticizes the Court for second guessing the trial judge. The dissent
emphasizes that it is the trial judge who is best able to assess the prosecutors' motives for
exercising a peremptory challenge. In the instant case, the determination by the trial court
was a permissible view of the evidence presented to the judge. Id. at 1213, 1215.
219

128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).

220

Id.at 1353.

221

Id.

222

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.

261
[hereinafter
Vienna
Convention],
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9-2 1963.pdf.
223 Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1352.
224 Id. at 1353.
225 Id.
226 United Nations Archive of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280050686 (last visited Apr. 18,
2009).
227 Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1353.
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Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the
Vienna Convention.228 This Protocol provides that disputes which
develop from an interpretation or an application of the Convention
"shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice., 229 Either party to the dispute is able to bring the
230
matter to the ICJ.
The ICJ is the judicial arm of the United Nations, 231 and it
came into existence the same year as the U.N. was established.232
Since a primary purpose of the U.N. is to provide a basis for world
peace and avoidance of armed conflict, 233 the formation of a world
court is basic to its mission. As Article 1 of the Charter of the U.N.
states, the purpose of the U.N. is to "bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace.' 234

A major issue in Medellin is what precisely is required as part
of the obligation of the U.S. to comply "with an ICJ decision to
which it is a party., 235 To Justice Stevens, who concurred in the

228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.

231 U.N. Charter art. 92.

232The formation of the U.N. occurred upon the ending of the Second World War in 1945.
Id. at Introductory Note, para. 1. The ICJ Statute is annexed to and an integral part of the
Charter itself. Id.
233The Preamble to the U.N. Charter begins in the statement that the peoples of the
United Nations are determined to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
which twice our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind." Id. at Preamble, para. 1.
234 Id. at art. 1, para. 1.

235 U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
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judgment of the Court in Medellin,236 this language did not require
the U.S. to immediately comply with an ICJ ruling, but rather only to
"promise to take additional steps to enforce ICJ judgments. ' '237 To
Justice Stevens, it was not required that the U.S. incorporate the ICJ
judgment into the domestic law of the U.S. And, especially, it was
not for the U.S. courts to act to ensure compliance; it was for the political branches. 238 And, in fact, it was for the politicians to determine
not only the manner in which to comply, but even "whether to comply" with an ICJ judgment.239 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the Charter provision is "not a directive
to domestic courts., 240 The "undertake to comply" language does not
require that the U.S. "shall" or "must" comply with the decision of
24
the ICJ.

1

If a treaty signed by the U.S. is considered to be a "selfexecuting one," then the treaty once it is ratified has domestic effect.
A "non-self-executing" treaty, however, does not, in and of itself, establish an enforceable federal law. Some treaties may clearly contain
a provision stating that it is to be deemed self-executing, in other instances, implementing legislation is required. In the opinion of the
Court in Medellin, the Vienna Convention was not self-executing and
therefore legislative action was to be required before it became a rule

236 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372 (Stevens, J., concurring).
237 Id. at 1373.
238
239
240
241

Id. at 1373-74.
Id. at 1374.
Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1358 (majority opinion).
Idat 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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that the courts must enforce.24 2
The Court held that the President, through his Memorandum
instructing state court compliance with the ICJ decision, 243 had attempted to unilaterally convert the non-self-executing treaty into one
that would have the force of domestic law.244 The President had no
such power.

The Constitution enables the President to "make" a

treaty,24 5 but it is for Congress to determine if an international obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty is to become domestic
law.2 46
Medellin, a Mexican citizen residing in the state of Texas, had
not been informed of his right to seek assistance from the Mexican
Consulate when he was arrested for murder.24 7 He was convicted and
sentenced to death; upon the direct appeal, both the sentence and the
finding of guilt were sustained.248 Medellin then filed a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, for the first time, that he had never been informed of his rights under the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations. 249

He claimed, therefore, that his conviction should not

stand.2 5 °
The state court of Texas dismissed the writ, concluding it was
too late; 251 this issue was never raised during trial, 252 nor on direct

Id. at 1368.
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
244 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368.
245 U.S. CONST. art. II, §2.
246 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368-69.
247 Id. at 1354.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1354. An individual may not ordinarily request a court post242
243
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appeal. 253 The Court determined that there is nothing on the merits
that would challenge Medellin's conviction or sentence.25 4 The state
court found that Medellin had "failed to show that any nonnotification of the Mexican authorities impacted on the validity of his
conviction or punishment." 255 Mexico brought the matter to the ICJ
claiming the United States had violated the Vienna Convention in
fifty-one cases in which defendants were similarly situated.256 This
was not the first time that such an action has been brought against the
U.S. Paraguay and Germany had previously sued in the ICJ claiming
that the U.S. had not informed defendants that they had the right to
contact their countries' consular officials upon arrest. 257

The ICJ

found the United States to be in violation of the Vienna Convention,
and ruled that the defendants who had been convicted in those cases
were entitled to a review and reconsideration of their convictions.2 58
Medellin then filed a writ, again in Texas state court, relying on the
ICJ holding.25 9 Meanwhile, President Bush issued a Memorandum
260
instructing the state to comply with the ruling of the ICJ.

President Bush, who had once been the governor of his home
state of Texas, was acting to protect a Mexican foreigner who had

conviction judicial review to consider legal arguments that were not raised at trial.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 1354-55.
255 Id.

256 Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1355.
257 Valerie Epps, Medellin v. Texas:

A Case Worthy of Comment, 31 SUFFOLK

TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 209, 209-10 (2008).
258 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1355.
259 See id.
260 Id.
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been convicted of murder and sentenced to death.261 He was instructing the Texas courts not to follow their longstanding and wellestablished criminal procedure rules, but instead to adhere to the ICJ
ruling.262 This demonstrates the extent to which the State Department
and the President had concluded that the United States had violated
international law by not following the Vienna Convention. 263 The
rule in Texas was that once someone filed one writ of habeas, they
could not file another writ.264 There was no procedure for successive

writs to be filed.265
The Texas court did, however, reconsider the matter as to acceptance of a second writ because a new writ had been filed relying
on the ICJ decision and the President's instruction.266 The Texas
court reiterated that there would be no exception made and that its

261 This was particularly remarkable given the fact that the President had initially referred
to the suit by Mexico as an "unjustifiable, unwise and ultimately unacceptable intrusion in
the United States criminal justice system." Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of Mexican Death Row Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, May 2007, at Al.
262 See Andrew McCarthy, Medellin (and Bush) v. Texas, available at
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?i.d=22836#continueA (Oct. 15, 2007);
Death Penalty Information Center, PresidentBush Orders Courts to Give Foreign Nationals
on Death Row FurtherReview, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/799 (last
visited Feb. 19, 2009). The President's Memorandum may be viewed as part of the overall
instrumentalist approach by the U.S. to international courts-international judicial authority
will be used when it suits U.S. interests. John Cerone, Making Sense of the U.S. President's
Intervention in Medellin, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 279, 284 (2008).
263 Ex Parte Medellin (Ex ParteMedellin 1), No. WR-50191-03, 2008 WL 2952485, at *3
(July 31, 2008) (Price, J., concurring).
264 Ex Parte Medellin (Ex Parte Medellin I1), 223 S.W.3d 315, 323 (Tex. 2006); see also
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a) (2007) (stating, in pertinent part that, "[i]f a
subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus is filed after filing an initial application, a
court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application
unless the application contains sufficient specific facts ....
265 Ex ParteMedellin II, 223 S.W.3d at 323.
266 Id.
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The Texas regula-

tions prohibiting a second writ of habeas corpus was controlling and
the Court refused to consider the renewed application.268 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that neither the ICJ decision nor
the President's Memorandum was to be considered as binding federal
law that would invalidate the limitation in Texas on the filing of successive applications for habeas.269 Judge Cochran wrote, in a concurring opinion, that the White House had engaged in "an unprecedented, unnecessary, and intrusive exercise of power over the Texas
court system.

' 270

Chief Justice Roberts wrote the decision for the Court and
found Texas was under no obligation to reconsider the matter on account of the World Court decision or in light of the President's
memorandum. 271 No international court can instruct a state what
criminal procedure rules it must follow.

272

This was a matter of do-

mestic sovereignty. 273 United States courts must retain judicial supremacy.274 The Supreme Court disregarded the Solicitor General's
argument on behalf of the United States that the President had authority to take steps to implement its treaty obligation under the Vienna

Id.
268 Id.at 332.
267

269

Id. at 352.

270 Ex Parte Medellin II, 223 S.W.3d at 356 (Cochran, J., concurring).
271 Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1353 ("We conclude that neither Avena nor the President's

Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on
the filing of successive habeas petitions.").
272 Id. at 1356.
273 Id. at 1356-57.
274 Id. at 1360.
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Convention as well as to implement rulings by the World Court.27 5
The opinion by Chief Justice Roberts for the Court is quite
critical of the President's interference in the matter at hand. Not only
does the Court refute the notion that President Bush had the authority
to give the ICJ decision the force of law, but that the President was
also implicitly prohibited from doing

SO.

276

The Court cited James

Madison's unambiguous statement that "the magistrate in whom the
whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law. 2 77 To
the Court, the President acted in violation of the separation of powers. The "Take Care" Clause of the Constitution relied on in Medellin's Brief2 78 gives the President the responsibility to "take care that
the Laws be faithfully executed. 279 To the Court in Medellin, this
clause merely reflects the perspective that the President is not to enact laws, but only to execute the laws made by Congress.28 °
Justice Breyer's dissent was joined by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg. It begins by citing the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution: all treaties "shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby., 28 1 The treaty's obliga-

275 Id. at 1368 ("Medellin adds the additional argument that the President's Memorandum

is a valid exercise of his power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed ....We disagree."). The complexity of this case is unchallenged. During the oral argument before the
Court, Chief Justice Roberts took the highly unusual step of permitting the scheduled one
hour argument to proceed for an additional twenty-six minutes. Linda Greenhouse, Case of
Texas Murderer Engrosses Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A 1.
276 Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1369.
277 Id. at 1369-70.
278 Brief for the United States, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medellin, 128 S.
Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 1909462 at *28.
279 U.S. CONST. art. II, §3.
280 Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1372.
281 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2. Whereas it is clear that the Vienna treaty was broken by the
failure to inform Medellin of his right to consular assistance, the question is what is the ap-
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tions undertaken by the U.S. relating to the ICJ holdings "bind[s] the
2 8 2 Juscourts" in the same way that a law passed by Congress does.

tice Breyer carefully presented an historical analysis of prior Court
holdings that have interpreted the concept of self-executing treaties. 2"

The Court's majority in Medellin is "misguided" in its em-

phasis on the absence or presence of language contained in a treaty
regarding self-execution.284 The ramifications of the Court's error
can be significant. "[I]t erects legalistic hurdles that can threaten the
application of provisions in many existing commercial and other treaties and make it more difficult to negotiate new ones. 285
Justice Breyer believed that the majority's attention should
have focused on the Supremacy Clause and the case law analyzing
that clause's applicability to treaties.286 Were the Court to have done
so, a "better supported, more felicitous conclusion" would have been
reached. 287 The ICJ judgment is enforceable by the U.S. courts; no
further legislative action is required.288 The relevant treaty provisions
are, in fact, self-executing.289
The dissent is unusually strong. The majority's failure "to
take proper account of ... precedent" 290 may well result in the Nation

propriate remedy.
282 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1376 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
283 Id. at 1377-80.
284 Id. at 1380-81.

285 Id. at 1381-82. Justice Breyer points to at least seventy treaties that contain provisions
for dispute settlement by the IJC. Id. at 1387.
286 Id. at 1389.
287 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1389 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
288 Id.
289 Id. at 1383.
290 Id. at 1392.
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breaking its word. 291 The decision increases the likelihood that our
Nation's reputation abroad will be diminished.292 Perhaps most importantly, it will become increasingly difficult to enforce the judgments of international tribunals and therefore "weaken that rule of
law for which our Constitution stands. 293
Mexico had filed an amicus brief maintaining in no uncertain
terms that Mexico was ready to help its nationals in death penalty
cases in the United States and that Mexico wanted to provide assistance to Medellin.294 Lost in the shuffle of the Supreme Court's decision was any true consideration of the rights of Medellin himself. It
was he who should have been told, but never was, that he had a right
to receive assistance in his representation from the Mexican embassy.295 It was his rights that the Vienna Convention was designed
to protect; his rights and those similarly situated had properly been
296
the concern of the ICJ.
Months after the Supreme Court's holding, there was a motion for a stay in the execution of the sentence.297 Medellin was about
to be put to death. The Supreme Court determined five-to-four not to

291

Id.

292 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1391 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Id.
294Brief for the Government of the United Mexican States as Amici Curiae Supporting
293

Petitioner, Medellin, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 1849797 at *16-17.
295 Id. at 22.
296 "International agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do
not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts ... "
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 907 cmt. a (2008). The ICJ is not empowered to hear disputes between individuals, but only between nations. Medellin, 128 S.
Ct. at 1360. The ICJ statute specifically provides that a decision of the court "has no binding
force except between the parties." Id. The parties in the case before the ICJ were the United
States and Mexico; Medellin himself was not a party.
297 Medellin v. Texas, 129 S.Ct. 360, 361 (2008).
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grant any stay in execution. 298 Justice Stevens' harshly worded dissent noted that the honor of this Nation was at stake-the obligations
of this Nation to follow international law, to uphold its treaty obligations-its reputation was at stake. 9 9 Justice Stevens concurred in the
judgment in the prior Medellin case.30 0 It appeared as though he had
expected either Texas or Congress to act appropriately and to comply

with the ICJ decision. 30 ' However, by this application for a stay, it
was clear that the legislatures were not going to act.30 2 Medellin's
execution, Justice Breyer wrote in his dissent, "will place this Nation
in violation of international law." 30 3 But the Court did not grant the
stay in the execution of the sentence, and within one hour after the
Court's decision, which was handed down at 10pm on August 5 1h
Medellin was put to death by the state of Texas.30 4 Within moments,

Mexico filed a formal diplomatic protest to the U.S. government in
Washington.30 5

298
299

Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 362 (Stevens, J.,dissenting) ("Balancing the honor of the Nation against the

modest burden of a short delay to ensure that the breach is unavoidable convinces me that
the application for a stay should be granted.").
300 Id. at 362.
301 Justice Stevens noted that he had written a separate opinion in Medellin to emphasize
that Texas had the duty to act to remedy the treaty violation. Id.
302 Justice Stevens noted that, "it appears that Texas has not taken action to address the
serious national security and foreign policy implications" of the breach of the United States'
treaty obligations. Medellin, 129 S.Ct. at 362.
303 Id. at 364 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'04 Id. at 361-62.
305 James C. McKinley, Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objectionfrom Bush and International Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A2. In its brief to the Court in Medellin, the
Mexican government had stated that bilateral relations between the U.S. and Mexico would
"unquestionably" be affected by the case. Linda Greenhouse, supra note 261, at A2.

HeinOnline -- 25 Touro L. Rev. 666 2009

2009]
V.

DEATH PENAL TY JURISPRUDENCE
CONCLUSION

It was a year of Supreme Court holdings relating to the death
penalty that pleased neither capital punishment abolitionists, nor
those strong supporters of the punishment. On the two most highly
anticipated rulings, the Court itself was divided-although in what
were perhaps unanticipated alliances.
No death sentence had been carried out in the U.S. from the
time the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Baze v. Rees,30 6 in
October 2007, until it issued its opinion. This was not the first time
that such a moratorium existed. At the time of independence, every
30 7
state had enacted legislation providing for the death penalty.
Michigan was the first state in 1846 to abolish its statute and has
3 °8
never enacted legislation to reinstate it.
Public executions, by hanging or firing squad, were the methods used in the early years of our country. The Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment was held to be applicable only to the punishment of torture.30 9 It was not until the
1910 case of Weems v. United States310 that the Court first held that a
sentence which was excessive and disproportionate to the offense

306
307

128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) ("It is apparent from the text of the

Constitution itself that the existence of capital punishment was accepted by the Framers. At
the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, capital punishment was a common sanction in
every State.").
308 The death penalty was, however, not abolished for the crime of treason. Judith Blum
& Jordan Steiker, Introduction, DEATH PENALTY STORIES 1 (Foundation Press 2009).
309 Justices Thomas and Scalia maintain that view. In their concurring opinion in Baze v.
Rees, Justice Thomas opines that "in my view, a method of execution violates the Eighth
Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain." Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring).
310 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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1 l
committed, would be in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
12
It was not until 1962, however, in Robinson v. California

that the Court first incorporated and applied the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth Amendment to the
states. 313 Ten years later, the Court in Furman v. Georgia314 declared
in a landmark decision impacting virtually all of the death penalty
statutes across the country that the laws as currently written were in
violation of the Constitution. 3 5 The Court had answered in the affirmative the question posed in the petition for certiorari of Furman:
"Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in this
case constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
316
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?,
But the moratorium on capital punishment was short-lived.
The day after the Furman holding, the legislatures of five states declared their intention to formulate new statutes that would meet the
Court's concerns.317 The President at the time, Richard Nixon, encouraged such a response by commenting that a death penalty was
"needed."'3 18 Four years later, the Court in Gregg v. Georgia approved a statute which provided for "guided discretion" and individualized determination by a jury as to who would receive a death

... Id. at 382.
312 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
313 Id. at 667.
314 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
315 Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).

316 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Furman,408 U.S. 238 (No. 71-5003), 1971 WL 134167
at *1.

317 Hugo Adam Bedau, Gregg v Georgia, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 129, 133.
318 Id. at 135.
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sentence.3 1 9 The Georgia jury was required to consider and weigh the
aggravating factors that may make a particular murder more deserving of a death penalty and contrast those factors to the mitigating circumstances relating to the crime itself or to the defendant's past.32 °
The Baze-created moratorium 321 had meant that there were the
lowest number of executions in 2007 since the 1976 Gregg holding
of the Court.3 22 But any hope for the continuation of the moratorium
ended with the holdings in Baze.323 The method of lethal injection
used by virtually every one of the thirty-six states that provide for a
death penalty 324 was determined not to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.32 5
What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment was the focus
of the Court in Kennedy v. Louisiana326 as well.

Would the 1977

Court decision in Coker v. Georgia,3 27 prohibiting the death penalty
for rape of an adult, be extended to also ban the execution of an individual convicted of raping a child? The Coker holding was a landmark and highly important one for the Court. It was the Coker decision that established the principle of utilizing a "prevailing standard
of decency test" in judging whether a criminal sentence constituted

319 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206.
320 Id.
321
322

See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
See PEW FORUM, AN IMPASSIONED DEBATE: AN

OVERVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN

AMERICA 1 (2008), http://www.pewforum.org/docs. There were only forty-two executions
in 2007. Id.
323 For more information, see Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion, which was joined by
Justice Souter. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1567-72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
324 Id. at 1525-26.
325 Id. at 1552.
326 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
327 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

328

Coker was the first time that the Court invalidated a sentence
because such punishment was determined to be excessive and disproportionate to the crime for which the defendant had committed.32 9 It
was this "excessiveness" analysis that led to the Court's holding in
2002 that it was unconstitutional to execute someone who had been
mentally retarded at the time of the commission of the crime. 330 The
same concerns regarding excessiveness led the Court to the 2005
holding in Roper v. Simmons,33 1 which stated that it was unconstitutional to give a death sentence to an individual who was less than
eighteen when the murder was committed.332
The excessive and disproportionate focus of the Court led to
the five-to-four decision in Kennedy, which held that a death sentence
for rape of a child was not constitutionally permitted.333 The "evolving standard of decency" test of Coker led the Court to engage in
state-counting. Since only six states had enacted statutes providing
for the death sentence for a child rapist, 334 the standard of decency
had not reached a point where a death sentence would be accept-

328 Id. at 603.

Id. at 598.
330 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
33 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
332 Id. at 578.
331 Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2664-65.
314 Id. at 2651. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court refused to give any weight to legislation pending but not yet enacted in other states. Id. at 2656 ("It is not our practice, nor is
it sound, to find contemporary norms based upon state legislation that has been proposed but
not yet enacted. There are compelling reasons not to do so here.").
329
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able. 335 The Court's bright line rule is an easy one to apply-death as
a sentence for any crime other than murder is excessive and disproportionate to the crime committed by the offender. "[T]here is a distinction," the Court observed, "between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against individual
persons, even including child rape, on the other." 336 Intentional murder is unique, the Court held, in terms of the moral depravity of the
perpetrator as well as the injury caused to both the victim and the to
the public.

337

The Court in Snyder v. Louisiana338 revisited an issue that has
come to the Court a number of times in the past, the use of the peremptory challenges by the prosecutor to strike a potential juror from
sitting in a death penalty proceeding. The Court most recently had
dealt with this matter in the 2007 case of Uttecht v. Brown. 339 The
Uttecht issue, as in Snyder, was whether the trial court's acceptance
of the prosecutor's challenge violated the defendant's due process
rights to an unbiased, impartial and fair jury.34 0 Uttecht, like Snyder,
involved a sentence of death.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 341 requires

335 The Court, in fact, concluded that "there is a national consensus against capital punishment for the crime of child rape." Id. at 2657-58.
336

Id. at 2660.

337 Id.
338 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008).

339 127 S. Ct. 2218 (2007).
340 Uttecht, 127 S. Ct. at 2222. For an in-depth analysis of Uttecht v. Brown, see Richard
Klein, An Analysis of Death Penalty Decisionsfrom the October 2006 Supreme Court Term,
23 TouRo L. REV. 793, 794-801 (2008).
341 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28 and 42 U.S.C.). See also 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1996).
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federal courts to defer to the determinations of the state trial courts as
long as the lower courts adhered to a reasonable application of the
facts.342 But, whereas the Court in Uttecht had upheld the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge,3 43 the Court did not do so in
Snyder.
The Court in Snyder was concerned with an alleged Batson
violation. In the 1986 case of Batson v. Kentucky, 344 the Court prohibited the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to eliminate a
juror due to his or her race.345 The initial jury pool for the Snyder
trial consisted of eighty-five jurors, nine of whom were black. Four
of the nine blacks were successfully challenged for cause, and the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike the other five.346
The all-white jury convicted the black defendant in one day
and sentenced him to death on the following day.34 7 The Court in
Snyder, in a seven-to-two decision, with Justice Alito writing the
opinion for the Court, concluded that the reason provided by the
prosecutor as the basis of the challenge was a pretext designed to
strike the juror because of his race.348 Notable in the Court's decision
was its refusal to simply defer to the trial court's determination that
the challenge was not race-based. 349 The Court's decision may well
serve to give notice to the prosecutor as well as the trial judges that

342 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Uttecht, 127 S. Ct. at 2222.
'44 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
141 Id. at 100.
346 Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1207.
147 Id. at 1207, 1210.
141 Id. at 1212.
149 See id.
141
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any reason given to the court to explain a use of a peremptory challenge after a Batson claim has been made must be carefully assessed
to ensure that the explanation is not just a pretext for racial discrimination.
To state that the history and background of Medellin v. Texas
is complex is an understatement. The issues presented concern the
obligation of the U.S. to adhere to treaties it signs; 350 the interrelationship between our national law and international law; 35' our foreign relations with Mexico; 352 the separation of powers amongst our
executive, judicial, and legislative branches;

353

the impact of a Presi-

dential Memorandum instructing a state to proceed in contravention
of its criminal procedure regulations; 354 and lastly, the validity of a
death sentence for Medellin.

355

It is undisputed that the U.S. did not adhere to its treaty obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.35 6 The
U.S. was required to inform Medellin, a Mexican citizen, that he had
a right to receive assistance from the Mexican Consulate. 35

7

No such

information was received by Medellin, who was convicted and sen359
tenced to death. 358 Mexico brought suit against the U.S. to the ICJ
and the ICJ determined that the U.S. had violated the Vienna Con-

350 Medellin, 129 S. Ct. at 1391 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
351
352

Id.
Id.

353 id.
354 id.
...

Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1391 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

356 Vienna Convention, supra note 222, at art. 36(l)(b).

311 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1353.
358 Id. at 1354.
359 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 16 (Mar. 31).
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vention. Although the ICJ did not act as requested by Mexico to nullify the conviction of Medellin, the Court did order the U.S. to provide "review and reconsideration" of the conviction.360
The Texas criminal procedure statues, however, prohibited a
defendant from filing more than one writ of habeas corpus.361 Medellin had filed a habeas petition before the ICJ decision had been issued, and the Texas courts prohibited a second filing.362 President
Bush, however, issued a Memorandum to the state courts to adhere to
the decision of the ICJ. 363 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did

reconsider its refusal to entertain a second petition for a writ, but
once again ruled that the Texas rules would control and no exception
would be made.364 The ICJ decision had specifically stated that the
review was to occur without regard to any state procedural default
rules.365
The six-to-three decision of the Court in Medellin concluded
the Texas rules would apply.366 Neither the ruling by the ICJ, nor the
President's Memorandum would act to preempt the limitations placed
by Texas on successive habeas corpus petitions. 367 A state may retain
the power to choose whether or not to comply with a treaty that is

360 Id.
361 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1353.
362 Id. at 1356.

363 Id. at 1355. The memorandum stated that the U.S. will discharge its obligations under
the ICJ holding by having the state court give effect to the decision "in accordance with [the]
general principles of comity." Id.
364 The Texas court had previously affirmed the ruling of a lower court that Medellin had
"failed to show that any non-notification affected the validity of his conviction and sentence." Ex Parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
365 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1355.
366

Id. at 1372.

367

id.
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signed by the U.S. and ratified by Congress. The decision of the
Court to uphold the right of the State of Texas occurred even though
the impact of the holding, in the eyes of the three dissenting justices,
may be of great concern. The holding, Justice Breyer wrote, complicates the President's role in determining foreign affairs, may worsen
relations with Mexico, may harm Americans who may be arrested
while traveling overseas, and may have the effect of "diminishing our
Nation's reputation abroad as a result of failure to follow the 'rule of
368
law' principles that we preach.,

Less than five months after the Court's decision, the matter
was again back before the Court; Medellin was seeking a stay in his
execution. 369 Although the Court had not in its initial consideration
of the Medellin case directly considered the matter of Medellin's
death sentence, the death penalty played a major role in Mexico's decision to bring suit in the ICJ. 370 The European Union, a strong op-

ponent of the death penalty, and especially the continuing use by the
U.S. of the death penalty, had joined an amicus brief on behalf of
Medellin.

371

368Id. at 1391 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
369 Medellin, 129 S. Ct. at 361.
370 See William Schabas, InternationalLaw, the United States of America and Capital
Punishment,31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 377, 379 (2008).
371Brief for the European Union et al. as Amici Curiae in Supporting Petitioner, Medellin,
128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 1874804. Other amici briefs filed in Medellin's behalf include: Brief of International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medellin, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 906700; Brief of Former United
States Diplomats as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Medellin, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (No.
06-984), 2007 WL 1886206; Brief of the American Bar Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medellin, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 1886208. Those filed
in support of Texas include: Brief of Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Medellin, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 2428385; Brief
of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Medellin,
128 S.Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 2428386; Brief of the Criminal Justice Legal Foun-
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The Court, in a five-to-four decision, denied the application
for a stay. The Court concluded that neither Congress nor Texas
were likely to act to give legal weight to the ICJ order. It had been
3 72
fourteen years since Medellin had initially been sentenced to death.
In spite of a strong dissent by Justice Breyer that "the execution
would violate our international treaty commitments ' 373 and by Justice
Stevens that the "honor of the Nation" is at stake,374 Medellin was
executed one hour after the Court's denial of the petition for the stay.
Although the Court's decisions constituted a mixed bagboth for supporters and opponents of the death penalty-it was a very
important term for the abolitionists. Justice Stevens, who voted in
the majority back in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia for the reinstitution of
the death penalty after a four-year lapse,375 declared in Baze v. Rees
that he now regarded the death penalty to be unconstitutional.376 He
relied on his own experience as a jurist in his determination that a
death sentence is patently excessive and constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. In doing so, Justice Stevens 377 joined former Justices
Brennan,378 Marshall,3 79 Blackmun, 380 and Powel1381 in reaching a

dation et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Medellin, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06984), 2007 WL 2428388.
372 Medellin, 129 S.Ct. at 362 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

373Id. at 363 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
374 Id. at 362 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17' Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158.
376

Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1551 (Stevens, J., concurring).

377 Justice Steven cites Justice White stating that the imposition of the death penalty was
"pointless" and had only "negligible returns." Id. (Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., con-

curring)).
378 Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 ("Today death is a uniquely and unusually severe punishment.").
379 Id. at 360 ("[C]apital punishment ... violates the Eighth Amendment because it is
morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in their history.").
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conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty is, per se, in violation of the Constitution.

380

Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) ("[T]he death penalty experiment has

failed.").
381 Justice Powell's repudiation occurred only after his retirement from the Court. See
David Von Drehle, Retired Justice Changes Stand on Death Penalty: Powell is Said to Favor EndingExecutions, WASH. POST, June 10, 1994, at Al.
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